Democratic Exploitation of a Non-Replenishable Resource by Burness, H. Stuart & Lewis, Tracy R.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
DEMOCRATIC EXPLOITATION OF A NON-REPLENISHABLE RESOURCE 
H. Stuart Burness 
California Institute of Technology 
and University of Kentucky 
Tracy T. Lewis 
California Institute of Technology 
...i..<,l\lUTf OF '"' ,.I". �'to 4 � er �!S � ..... Cl � _ffi -< 
*--:;. /dq(l\ i 
l--1: /'l\ \ ... �11 S1t.4LL tAJl-'f..\. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1'61 
March 1977 
DEMOCRATIC EXPOLITATION OF A NON REPLENISHABLE RESOURCE* 
by 
H. Stuart Burnesst 
University of Kentucky 
and 
California Institute of Technology 
and 
Tracy R. Lewis 
.California Institute of Technology 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent article, Neher (1976) suggests an interesting demo-
cratic process for allocating a scarce, renewable natural resource 
among different generations. The procedure is characterized by 
a) continuous voting, b) one person--one vote, c) unsophisticated 
voting, and d) simple majority rule, and determines the length of 
the optimal exploitation plan in a society of overlapping generations. 
Allocations resulting from this plan are revealed to be unjust in the
"Rawlsian" sense as the selfishness of living voters is reflected in 
current decisions. 
We adopt the same procedure to determine the allocation of a non-
renewable resource under democratic exploitation. With continuous 
democratic voting, plans are continuously revised and resources are 
forever being consumed at a rate which is a constant proportion of the 
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total resource available. As before, democratic exploitation of the 
resource is unjust in the Rawlsian sense: succeeding generations are 
given smaller allocations of the resource. 
A natural question concerns the conditions under which the demo-
cratic allocation coincides with the socially opt:lmal allocation 
based on a utilitarian principle of justice. The implicit treatment 
of fu.ture generations under democratic exploitation becomes explicit 
upon observing the intertemporal weighting of generational utilities 
which induces a benevolent central planner to adopt the democratic 
allocation. As expected, declining weights discount the welfare 'of 
more distant generations with the discount rate reflecting the 
degree of inequity implicit in the democratic allocation. 
II . DEMOCRATIC ALLOCATIONS 
Following Neher we consider a society with overlapping genera-
tions. Individuals desire to allocate the resource so as to maximize 
utility over their expected lifetime. For simplicity, we assume utility 
is only derived from consuming the resource; the resource has no 
intrinsic value 'in itself. Assuming that people weight utility equally 
in all periods (see Fisher (1930, p. 84)) and that there is decreasing 
marginal utility of consumption, ·each individual plans lifetime con-
sumption according to the rule: 
c (t) = 1 Y(O) for te [O, T] 
T (1) 
where c(t) is the rate of resource 'consumption at time t, Y(t) is the 
resource remaining at time t, and T �is the individual's life span. 
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Individuals of various ages pref er different consumption 
plans bas�d on their life expectancy. To resolve generational con-; 
flicts, .society votes for an optimal depletion horizon, T, according 
to .eher's procedure, and resource use is planned at a constant rate 
over that interval. But since voting is continuous and consumption 
plans are.constantly revised, the exhaustion date for the resource 
is repeatedly postponed. With continuous planning revision, society. 
ultimately follows the plan described by the rule 
c (t) = Y (t) , te[0, 00] 
T
(2) 
so that planned current consumption is proportional to the existing 
resource supply and the resource is never· depleted. The inequity in
the allocation is clear; future generations have less to consume, 
the welfare of succeeding generations being implicitly discounted by 
those alive today. 
III. CENTRALLY PLANNED ALLOCATIONS 
One way to analyze the welfare properties of the democratic 
allocation is to ask if there exists a set of weights attached to gen-
erational utilities that would induce a benevolent central planner 
to select the democratic allocative rule of Eq. (2). Assume the 
planner chooses the path, c, and the horizon, T, so as to maximize 
social welfare W, given by 
subject to 
T oo 
W = l a(t)u(c(t))dt + l a(t)u(O)dt 
0 T 
(3) 
T 
Y (O) - l c(t)dt > 0 
0 
(4) 
where a (t) > 0 is tht relative weight attached to the welfare of 
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persons alive at time t and u (c (t)) is the social welfare of consump­
tion at time t, with u' (0) = "" u' > O, u" < 0 and lim u(c) = u (O). 
c+O 
The second term of the right hand side of Eq. (3) represents the 
utility of those persons having none of the resource to consume.1 
The maximization of (3) subject to (4) is a straightforward 
variational problem for which necessary conditions require that along 
the optimal path c, 
a (t)u' (c (t)) - ). .. 0 (5)
where ). is the IDUltiplier attached to the stock constraint in (4), 
and that 
� .. 0 
lim a(t)[u (c (t))-u (O)-u' (c (t))c (t)] • 0 
t+T 
If T is finite then (7) becomes 
(6) 
(7) 
1unless we arbitrarily set u (O) = O, the "scrap value" function must 
logically be included as part of W. The assumptions that !.!5 u (c) 
= u(O) and �.!5 u' (c) = 00 implicitly represent the planners' eithical 
attitudes towards depletion ; for examples of alternative attitudes
see Koopmans (1974) and Vousden (1973). Barry (1975) explores the 
implications of such ethical attitudes in a different context. 
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u(c('t))-u(O) = u' (c(T)) c(T) c7 I ) 
which in view of the assumption u'(O) = m implies c(T) = O. However, 
by (5), c(T) = 0 and T finite imply c(t) = 0 for all t, contradicting 
the optimality of c. Hence T is infinite; all generations consmne 
some of the resource. 
Differentiating (5) with respect to time, and assmning a(t) is 
.·continuously differentiable, we have that along the socially optimal 
path 
c a 1 
c = a n(c) (8) 
u"c where Tl (c) = -T is the elasticity of marginal utility. Differ-
entiating (2) with respect to time yields, for the democratic 
allocation 
c 1 (9) -= - -
c T 
In general there is a set of weights ( a(t) ) such that the socially 
optimal plan corresponds to the democratic allocation. Eq. (8) and 
(9) imply that the weights a(t) must satisfy 
.!!. = 
a 
_ n (c) 
T 
"(10) 
The explicit weight applied to future generations is declining and 
a/a is the rate of discount applied against individuals living in 
succeeding periods. In general, the rate at which future generational 
welfare is discounted will vary over time. Differentiating (10) with 
respect to time we obtain 
so that 
d 
dt ( �) = 
. 
_ en' (c) 
T 
d 1a1< > dt (i > 0 as 119 � o 
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(11) 
(12) 
Thus the discount rate is decreasing or increasing over time as the 
elasticity of marginal utility decreases or increases with c. 
Consider the special case where u(c) has constant elasticity of 
2 -
marginal utility , �. Eq. (10) simplifies to 
a 
a = -p - .!!. ! (13) 
3. 
so that the absolute value of the discount rate , p, varies inversely 
with T. Thus a society c0111posed primarily of the elderly (young) 
voting to exhaust the resource over a short (long) time interval in· 
4 
effect discounts the welfare of future societies more (less) heavily • 
2The class of utility functions with constant elasticity of marginal 
1-a c utility includes only the functions u(c) = l-a where a > 0, a + 1 
and u(c) = ln u(c). 
3 -pt In this case a(t) = e 
4Analogous statements can be made concerning the relationship between 
p and Tl• In particular Eq. (13) implies that for larger n a larger 
p is required to induce the democratic allocation. All else being 
equal, when n is large the central planner will allocate consumption 
more equally among generations since the decrease in marginal utility 
is relatively large for generations consuming more of the resource. 
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Theories of distributive justice are troublesome in their 
application to the allocation of non renewable resources. Equal 
distribution across all generations is difficult to :Imagine because 
of the finiteness of the resource. Democratic exploitation, without 
planning revision, results in a truncated equal distribution over 
T generations; With planning revision, some of the resource is 
consumed by all generations. Nevertheless, the distribution is 
"unjust, " as the welfare of future generations iS :Implicitly 
discounted. 
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